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Abstract
Fleurbaey and Maniquet have proposed the criteria of conditional
equality and of egalitarian equivalence to assess the equity among indi-
viduals in an ordinal setting. Empirical applications are rare and only
partially consistent with their framework. We propose a new empir-
ical approach that relies on individual preferences, is consistent with
the ordinal criteria and enables to compare them with the cardinal
criteria. We estimate a utility function that incorporates individual
heterogeneous preferences, obtain ordinal measures of well-being and
apply conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence. We then pro-
pose two cardinal measures of well-being, that are comparable with
the ordinal model, to compute Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria.
Finally we compare the characteristics of the worst-off displayed by
each criterion. We apply this model to a sample of US micro data and
obtain that about 18% of the worst-off are not common to all criteria.
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1 Introduction
Inequality of opportunity is traditionally measured by selecting a particular
outcome and decomposing it into two kinds of determinants: the factors
beyond the individuals’ responsibility, often called circumstances, and the
factors for which the individual can be held responsible, the responsibility
factors. Equality of opportunity requires erasing unfair inequalities due to
circumstances but maintaining fair inequalities due to responsibility factors.
As a result, outcomes should be a function of responsibility factors only.
From this definition, two main criteria have been applied in empirical
analysis : firstly, Roemer’s criterion requires that individuals who exert the
same effort (being the responsibility factor) obtain the same outcome. This
corresponds to the ex-post view of equality of opportunity. If this is not the
case, an equality of opportunity policy would consist in maximizing the out-
come of those who obtain the lowest outcome at each level of effort. A second
criterion proposed by Van de gaer’s states there is equality of opportunity if
the mean outcomes conditional to circumstances are equal. As people who
share the same circumstances are called a type, the target of a policy aiming
at reducing inequality of opportunity should give the priority to the type with
the lowest average outcome. This latter criterion expresses an ex-ante view
of equality of opportunity. In both cases, to apply these criteria, we need
to be able to compare individuals’ outcome and to aggregate them such as
to define the appropriate policy. To do so, Roemer and Van de gaer criteria
rely on a cardinal approach.
Another stream of the literature is reluctant to use cardinal measures.
By observing the outcome picked by an individual, we may derive informa-
tion on individuals’ preferences but not necessarily on the intensity of these
preferences. As a result, it would be more appropriate to work in an ordinal
framework. Notwithstanding its relevance, using an ordinal setting might
raise one problem in the context of equality of opportunity: the distinct level
of effort may be interpreted as heterogeneous preferences, and it is impossible,
as exposed in the Arrow’s impossibility theorem, to obtain a social ordering
that respects fully heterogeneous preferences in an ordinal framework.
One contribution of Fleurbaey and Maniquet [12, 14, 15, 16] has been to
define fairness criteria in an ordinal setting that allow interpersonal compar-
isons. Their solution consists in representing first heterogeneous preferences
in an ordinal setting in which the way individuals rank situations would re-
veal their preferences. Then, they propose to rank individuals’ situations
according to fairness criteria by making explicit the normative choices that
will enable interpersonal comparisons.
Their work in the field of welfare economics is strongly related to the
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concept of equality of opportunity [13] because the social rankings they pro-
pose are based on equity criteria very similar to the definition of equal-
ity of opportunity. They consider that individuals’ well being is the rele-
vant outcome on which should be based social rankings and the observed
choices made by the individual should be the method to identify their pref-
erences. In addition, since individual’s well-being is a function of preferences
and non-responsibility factors, policies should erase inequalities due to non-
responsibility factors and be neutral1 with respect to preferences. In partic-
ular, fair policies should rely on two principles derived from the non-envy
principle.
The first principle corresponds to the compensation principle. Compen-
sation means we should compensate for factors for which the individual is
not responsible. Therefore, people with the same preferences should achieve
the same well-being. This is very similar to Roemer’s criterion that requires
people with the same responsibility factors should end up with an equal
outcome.
The second principle corresponds to the neutrality principle. Neutrality
refers to the neutral treatment of individuals with respect to their preferences.
This neutrality principle means that individuals should be treated equally
with respect to their preferences2. As a result, redistribution mechanisms
should be designed in such a way that individuals with equal circumstances
will pay/receive the same taxes/transfers. This principle is closer to Van de
gaer’s criterion that recommends people to have equal opportunities what-
ever their non-responsibility factors. Because people should have the same
opportunities before making their own choice (i.e. deciding on their respon-
sibility factor), this principle encapsulates the idea of neutrality according
to which the treatment of the individuals should be independent from their
responsibility factors.
The compensation and neutrality principles cannot be both satisfied when
individuals have heterogeneous preferences [6, 16, 21]. That is why, Fleur-
baey and Maniquet measure unfairness through two criteria, each one giving
the priority to one principle and fulfilling only partially the second one. The
criterion of conditional equality fulfils the neutrality principle and compen-
sates partially inequalities due to non-responsibility factors. The criterion of
egalitarian equivalence gives priority to the compensation principle but does
1Here neutral means that policies should not compensate for preferences. In this con-
text, inequalities between individuals having distinct preferences do not give rise to redis-
tribution.
2This idea could be questioned if we consider that some goals or preferences should be
avoided according to some prevalent values but this discussion falls outside the scope of
this paper.
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not satisfy neutrality with respect to all preferences.
Given the existence of these four criteria (Roemer’s ex-post approach, Van
de gaer’s ex-ante view, conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence), the
aim of the paper is twofold: (1) proposing a model in an ordinal set-up that
approximates individuals’ preferences; (2) comparing the four criteria in a
common framework by checking whether their identification of the worst-off
is consistent
Our first objective is to propose a model in an ordinal set-up that approx-
imates individuals’ preferences through the observable choices made by the
individuals. This enables us to apply Fleurbaey and Maniquet by respecting
their theoretical approach. In fact, previous empirical applications of Fleur-
baey and Maniquet’s criteria have been adapted in a cardinal framework:
Almas [3] and Devooght [9] have used the definition of conditional equality
and egalitarian equivalence to measure unfair inequalities for income, and
because everyone is supposed to prefer more income to less, they did not use
heterogeneous preferences. Then, Decoster and Haan [8] have proposed on
German data the first application that follows the key points of the Fleur-
baey and Maniquet’s approach, especially the identification of heterogeneous
preferences and the use of an ordinal framework. Bargain et alii [4] extend
their work and propose an international comparison for 11 European coun-
tries and the US based on egalitarian equivalence criteria. Notwithstanding
their breakthrough in the field, the preferences they use are still collective
(based on socio-demographic variables) and not genuinely individualistic. In
this paper, we propose an extension of Decoster and Haan’s model such as
to approximate the individualistic component of preferences.
Our second objective is to propose a way to compare the conditional
equality and egalitarian equivalence criteria with Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria3. To this end, we have to solve two issues.
Firstly, we need a cardinal measure of well-being4. To obtain it, we use
two distinct strategies. On the one hand, we erase heterogeneity in prefer-
ences such as to obtain a cross-individual comparable measure of well-being.
This corresponds to the assumption made to apply conditional equality. On
the second hand, we take a money metric for utility that is used for im-
plementing the egalitarian equivalence criterion. In both cases, we rely on
explicit assumptions that make comparable the four criteria.
3To our best knowledge, only a theoretical comparison of the four criteria has been
performed [13]
4This necessary step for the comparison goes not without critics. Some consider Roe-
mer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria cannot be applied to well-being, because of the practical
difficulty of measuring well-being in a cardinally measurable and comparable way. The
interpretations of the results remain subject to this limitation.
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Secondly, we have to split between effort and non-responsibility factors
instead of the split between preference and non-responsibility factors used in
the ordinal model. We take the same non-responsibility factors as the one
used for conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence. Concerning effort,
since it is here not directly observable, we use Roemer’s Identification Axiom
(RIA). By assuming that the outcome is a monotonous increasing function of
effort, individuals who sit at the same percentile of the outcome’s distribution
function of their type have exerted the same effort.
For illustrative purpose, we finally apply the model to a sample of US
singles from the 2005 Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) dataset. We
identify who are the worst-off and check if they change when we take, or
not, into account individual preferences. We then compare the worst-off
across the four criteria and check their socio-demographic characteristics.
This comparison across criteria informs us about the impact of the normative
choices that enable interpersonal comparisons on the measures of fairness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the em-
pirical approach to estimate utility and the way we extend it to incorporate
individual preferences. Section 3 presents the way we measure conditional
equality and egalitarian equivalence, while Section 4 compares with Roe-
mer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria. The data and main results are presented in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A discrete choice model to apply the criteria
The objective is to identify heterogeneous preferences in an ordinal frame-
work where the individual’s well-being depends on consumption and leisure.
To this end, we start by presenting a utility model close to the one developed
by Aaberge et al. [1, 2] and Decoster and Haan [8]. We then extend these
approaches and detail how individual preferences can be genuinely approxi-
mated.
2.1 Estimation of groups’ preferences
We here rely on the models developed by Aaberge et al. [1, 2] and Decoster
and Haan [8] where the labour time is discretized into a finite number of inter-
vals. We assume that the individual’s well-being is representable through a
utility function that depends on consumption C, leisure L, socio-demographic
variables X and a random error term ij that varies independently among
individuals. The subscript j corresponds to the discretized labour time. The
error term ij is not observed but affects individuals’ choices. The utility
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function can be written as follows:
V (C,L,X, ) = U(C,L,X) +  (1)
and the utility of individual i when working Lij hours is:
Vij = V (Cij, Lij, Xi, ij) (2)
The two sub-indices i and j may appear redundant. They aim to show
that utility differs across individuals i and across alternatives over the work-
ing time j. Indeed, the earnings C depend on the wage rate that varies
across the individuals i and depend on the amount of working time. Also,
the amount of leisure L depend on preferences for leisure, defined individ-
ually, and the working hours. Finally, ij is also assumed to vary across
individuals and alternatives.
The individual i maximizes his utility by choosing his amount of working
hours (h = 1 − L) from a set of the alternatives on working time j ∈ J5.
Empirically, as we use a discrete choice model, we restrict the individual’s
choices such that the individual is free to select his weekly working time
among 9 alternatives (less than 20 hours, around 20 hours, around 25 hours,
around 30 hours, ... around 50 hours, and more than 50 hours).
The individual is subject to a budget set that depends on the wage rate
received by the individual, the amount of labour time and the taxes he pays
on his gross earnings. The wage rate is supposed to be constant whatever
the amount of labour time picked by the individual. As the actual taxes are
not linear, we use information on income taxes given by the OECD such as
to estimate the actual individual’s budget set, that is to say, to calculate the
net earnings an individual would receive for each of the 9 alternatives.
The budget set can be written as:
C = w × h− t(w, h) (3)
Where t(w, h) is the tax function that shifts gross earnings to disposable
income (i.e. net wage).
Regarding the deterministic part of the utility function, we use the same
specification as Aaberge et al. [1, 2] and Decoster and Haan [8]:
U(C,L) = βC
CαC − 1
αC
+ βL(X)
LαL − 1
αL
(4)
5j and h both represent the working hours. Nevertheless we use both to maintain the
intuitive meaning of h being the labour time, and j the discrete alternative.
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The parameters βC , αC , βL(X) and αL determine preferences for con-
sumption and leisure. βC , αC and αL are common to all individuals. Hetero-
geneity among groups of individuals is introduced through βL that depends
on socio-demographic variables:
βL(X) = βL0 + βL1X (5)
Where X are gender, age, education and ethnic group.
The variables that explain the differences in the preference for leisure have
been widely used in the literature to explain the determinants for labour sup-
ply. They are not really under the individual’s control but they are expected
to explain differences in preferences for leisure. In fact, Dworkin [10, 11],
Rawls [19], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [15] share the view that we should be
neutral with respect to preferences as long as individuals identify themselves
with these preferences. No matter what explains individuals’ differences in
preferences. We follow the view of these authors, therefore βL represents
individuals’ preferences, for which no compensation is required.
To obtain the parameters of the deterministic part of the utility function,
the estimation relies on a rationality assumption. It states that, if the ith
individual makes the choice j, Vij is the maximum among the j alternatives.
In other words, the probability that the ith individual makes the choice j is:
Prob(hi = j) = Prob(Vij > Vik)∀k 6= j (6)
We replace Vij and Vik by its expression, rearrange and obtain:
Prob(hi = j) = Prob(ik − ij < −(Uik − Uij))∀k 6= j (7)
The resulting multinomial model is treatable if we assume that ij is
i.i.d random value with type I extreme value distribution, then differences in
epsilon follow a standard logistic distribution [7]. In this case, we estimate
the parameters of the utility function by maximum likelihood as a conditional
logit model where:
Prob(li = j) =
expUi(Cij, Lij)∑9
k=1 expU(Cik, Lik)
(8)
We obtain as many utility functions as numbers of groups having the
same socio-demographic characteristics. Formally, we have:
Vij(C,L) = βC
CαCij − 1
αC
+ (βL0 + (βL1Xi))
LαLij − 1
αL
+ ij (9)
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Individuals who have the same leisure and the same consumption may
obtain a distinct well-being if they have a distinct βL. In other words, the
form of the utility function varies across individuals who have a different age
or gender or education or ethnic group.
In the end, with this estimation proposed by Aaberge et al. [1, 2] and De-
coster and Haan [8], we estimated groups’ preferences for leisure. However,
Fleurbaey and Maniquet recommend to identify individuals’ preferences, as
the criteria they propose allow us to establish individuals’ rankings. Iden-
tifying groups’ preferences is not really satisfactory to establish individuals’
rankings. This is why, we propose an extension of this model.
2.2 Approximation of individual’s preferences
βL is determined by socio-demographic variables and does not include in-
formation specific to the individuals. On the contrary, ij is specific to the
individual i and to the alternative j and has an impact on the well-being Vij.
The error term, ij, captures the individualistic component of preferences not
explained by βL. The point is here to show how to derive some information
related to this unobserved heterogeneity.
After estimating the parameters of U(C,L), we can compute the utility
an individual would obtain for each alternative j ∈ J . It may occur that the
individual maximises his utility for the amount of labour time he actually
chose. In this case, to the extent the model is well specified, the individual
has the same preferences as the group to which he belongs.
But, we can also have a situation where the individual maximises his
utility for an amount of labour time he did not choose. Formally, we can
observe U(Cij, Lij) < U(Cik, Lik) where j is the amount of labour time the
individual has actually chosen and k is one or some other possible alterna-
tives. However, following the assumption of our model according to which
the individual is rational, we should have V (Cij, Lij) > V (Cik, Lik) for all
the other possible alternatives k.
Assuming the model is well specified and using the expression of Vij, we
deduce that ij may explain why, at the same time, the individual does not
maximise his utility Uij for his actual labour time j, whereas he actually
maximizes his utility Vij when picking a labour time j. In such a case, ij
captures the individualistic component of preferences not explained by βL.
Still, ij is not observable after the estimation. In this sense, we cannot
capture the individual’s preferences. Nevertheless, building on the work of
Bonin and Schneider (2006) [5] who propose an analytical approach to ex-
tract information from the ij in the conditional logit model, we can use the
assumptions of the model to get a proxy for differences in epsilon as follows:
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(1) if the individual has picked the alternative j, this means that the util-
ity he obtains with this option is superior to any other alternative. Formally,
it requires that:
ik − ij < −(Uik − Uij)∀k 6= j (10)
Omitting indexes, we can say that because individuals are rational, we
have to satisfy:
∆ < −∆U (11)
Figure 2 shows how the maximum value of ∆ is computed for each in-
dividual whose chosen number of working hours (j hours) differs from the
numbers of working hours maximizing his estimated utility (k hours).
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
(2) The hypothesis of the estimation, according to which differences in ep-
silon follow a standard logistic distribution, requires that the density function
of ∆ be:
f(∆) =
exp ∆
(1 + exp ∆)2
(12)
Using (1) and (2) permits us to rescale the density function of ∆ so that:
f(∆|∆ < ∆U) = f(∆)
Prob(∆ < ∆U)
=
f(∆)
P
∀ < −∆U (13)
= 0 ∀ ≥ −∆U (14)
where P is:
P = 1− exp ∆U
1 + exp ∆U
(15)
This rescaling matters for our purpose, since it allows us to improve the
identification of the form of the indifference set (or utility curve) of every
individual by using part of the individual unobserved preferences.
With our estimation we can compute the utility received by an individual
for the bundle (Ci, Li) he actually chose. With this information, we can com-
pute the level of consumption an individual would need to obtain the same
utility if he choose another labour time. As a consequence we can compute
the 9 points of the indifference set (since the individual has 9 alternatives of
labour time).
The points of an indifference set are such that Vik = Vij ∀k 6= j. By
replacing Vik and Vij by their expressions and omitting the index i, each
point of the indifference set is as follows:
(C˜k, Lk) = ([C
αC
j +
αC
βC
(∆+
βL
αL
(LαLj − LαLk ))]
1
αC , Lk) (16)
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Where C˜k is the level of consumption conditional on labour time 1 − Lk
required to have a utility equal to Vij.
We observe that the formula requires a value for ∆. This is why the
rescaling matters. Given the unconditional density function of ∆, we gener-
ate one million drawings of a random variable that follows a standard logistic
distribution so as to obtain one million possible values for ∆. Then, for each
alternative and each individual, we measure ∆U . We finally plug these pieces
into the formula given in Equation 13 to compute conditional expected values
of ∆.
To summarize, what we have done is to use the assumptions about the
distribution of ∆ and the rationality hypothesis to define the conditional
distribution ∆. This allows us to better approximate the indifference set of
every individual as the form of the indifference set is specific to the individual
when E(∆) is different from zero. Still, two individuals who (1) share the
same socio-demographic characteristics and (2) maximize U for their chosen
labour time have the same indifference set.
3 Identification of the worst-off according to
conditional equality and egalitarian equiva-
lence
We start this section by some methodological preliminaries and then present
the way each criterion is empirically implemented and the worst-off identified,
starting by conditional equality and following by egalitarian equivalence.
3.1 Methodological preliminaries
3.1.1 A simplified budget set
The economy is characterized by a set of N agents i that maximize their util-
ity ui(C,L) over consumption (i.e. disposable income) and leisure (C,L) ∈
X = {R+ × (0, 1)}. Since we allow individuals to have heterogeneous prefer-
ences for leisure, a same bundle (C,L) will, in general, not lead to an equal
well-being.
Every individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget set B ⊆ X.
The budget represents the level of consumption accessible to the individual.
It varies for each individual because it depends on (1) the individual’s wage
rate w that is assumed to be constant whatever the individual’s labour time,
(2) the amount of labour time h = 1 − L and (3) the tax rate t applied to
the gross labour earnings.
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This budget set is not linear, since t is progressive and varies along with
w × h. This is a problem, since we aim to preserve as far as possible the
neutrality principle (see Section 1). The non-linearity of the budget set is
incompatible with that principle. Taxing more those who like to work is not
neutral.
This is why, before implementing the conditional equality and egalitarian
equivalence criteria, a preliminary transformation of the actual budget set
into a simplified (linear) budget set is necessary. The simplified budget set is
composed of the lump sum transfer that would make the individual just as
well-off as he is in his current situation (given his observed wage rate and his
freedom to choose the bundle (C,L) according to his preferences). Figure 3
illustrates how a progressive tax scheme is approximated by a lump-sum tax
design or, in other words, how a non-linear budget set (the net wage curve)
is replaced by a linear budget set (the simplified net wage line).
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
We obtain nested budget sets by replacing the actual budget set by a
lump-sum transfer. Given every individual maximizes his utility subject to
a budget set B ⊆ X, the utility function derived from any subset B is
ui(B) = {maxui(C,L)|(C,L) ∈ B} (17)
The simplified budget set B∗ ⊆ X, is determined by the gross income
and a lump-sum transfer tˆ such that
B∗(w, tˆ) =
{
(C,L) ∈ X|C ≤ w × l + tˆ} (18)
and
ui(B) = ui(B
∗(w, tˆ)) (19)
3.1.2 Responsibility versus non-responsibility factors
Before defining the fairness criteria, we also need to precise the split between
responsibility and non-responsibility factors.
In Fleurbaey and Maniquet setting, the non-responsibility factor is the
wage rate. The wage rate is likely to represent skills that are mostly the
product of genetics, family background, luck but also effort. Despite this
choice appears to be quite controversial, we aim to implement the criteria
following the spirit of their authors. We therefore take the same hypothesis.
The responsibility factors are individuals’ preferences and correspond to the
preferences for leisure and consumption. Once identified the wage rate, the
individual’s preferences and the implicit budget set, we now explain in further
detail the equity criteria.
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3.2 Conditional equality
Conditional equality permits to fulfil completely the neutrality principle and
achieve partially the compensation for circumstances. Formally defined by
Fleurbaey [12], conditional equality can be computed as follows:
“Define a reference value for responsibility characteristics and give
priority (according to the leximin criterion) to individuals, who,
with their current resources and circumstances and this reference
value of responsibility characteristics, would be the worst-off.”
In a nutshell, the idea enclosed in this principle is the following: in a fair
economy, if individuals had the same preferences, they would end up with
the same well-being. Thus, the individuals who would obtain the lowest well-
being, given a reference value for preferences, are those whose well-being is
the most negatively affected by the non-responsibility factors. They are the
worst-off. A conditional equality rule would consist in neutralizing the effect
of circumstance for the people having the same reference value for preferences.
In this framework, implementing conditional equality requires defining
a reference value for preferences. This is done by fixing a reference utility
function. Individuals with the same preferences should obtain the same well-
being.
Formally, individuals are ranked according to:
u˜(B(w, tˆ)) (20)
where u˜ (note the absence of the subscript i) is the reference utility func-
tion that results from fixing a reference value for preferences6 and where tˆ is
the lump-sum transfer corresponding to the simplified budget set such that:
ui(C,L) = ui(B(w, tˆ)) (21)
Equivalently, in programmatic terms, we estimate for each of the 9 work-
ing time intervals the pairs (C˜k, Lk) defining the utility derived from the
choice made by the individual, as defined in Formula 16. We then estimate,
given the gross wage rate, the tax required to reach the indifference curve for
each working time. The optimizing consumption leisure bundle is the one
where the tax is the largest. The worst-off are those on the lowest utility
curve.
6Instead of fixing a reference value for the form of the utility function, an alternative
would be to fix a reference value for labour time. It is equivalent with stating that all
individuals have preferences such that they decide to work the same amount of working
hours.
12
Figure 4 illustrates the conditional equality criterion for two reference
value for the preferences, one where βL is set to 10 (low preference for leisure),
and one where βL is set to 70 (larger preference for leisure).
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Figure 5 shows a case where the worst-off is the one with the higher
(simplified) net wage rate (John) contrary to the case depicted in Figure
4 where the worst-off is the one with the lower (simplified) net wage rate
(Mary).
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
Since the results change depending on the reference value for βL and on
the inclusion or not of the ∆ , we estimate five variants. First we set βL to
its average (close to 10), and include the unobserved heterogeneity through
∆. Second, we keep βL at its average but set the ∆ to zero. These first two
variants allow to assess the impact of considering the individual preferences.
In variants three to five, we keep ∆ and increase the preference for leisure
by incrementing βL to 20, 70 and 100 respectively. For each variant, the
worst-off are the 10% of individuals with the lowest utility.
3.3 Egalitarian Equivalence
The second equity criterion, egalitarian equivalence, fulfils completely the
compensation principle and partially the neutrality principle. As defined by
Fleurbaey [12], it requires the following:
“Define a reference type of circumstances and give priority (lex-
imin) to individuals whose current level of well-being would be
obtained with the least resources if their circumstances were of
the reference type”
This method mimics a situation where inequalities would be due to re-
sponsibility characteristics only. As a consequence, the redistribution rule
that emerges from this principle fulfils the compensation principle but may
treat unequally individuals with the same circumstance.
Regarding the application, Fleurbaey proposes to use different reference
values for the wage rate as the reference value affects people ranking. The
ranking depends on the apportion between preferences and income. The
higher the reference wage rate, the larger the priority given to people having
lower preferences for leisure, that is to say the hard-working people.
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If the reference wage rate is equal to zero, we obtain the zero egalitarian
equivalence. To this end, we rank tˆi in ascending order as defined by :
ui(C,L) = ui(B(0, tˆ)) (22)
Figure 6 illustrates the zero-wage egalitarian equivalence for two heteroge-
neous individuals (John has a relative preference for income/work and Mary
for leisure). We see that the lump-sum tax required to compensate the loss
of disposable income is higher for John. Mary is the worst-off.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
If the reference wage rate is equal to the minimum wage rate (set at 5
USD per hour), we will obtain the minimum-wage egalitarian equivalence. It
consists in ranking in ascending order the tˆ as defined by
ui(C,L) = ui(B(minj∈Nwj, tˆ)) (23)
Figure 7 illustrates the minimum-wage egalitarian equivalence for John
and Mary. We see that the lump-sum tax required to compensate the loss
of disposable income is higher for John. Mary is the worst-off in this case
again.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
Lastly, the wage egalitarian equivalence or equivalent wage is defined in
Fleurbaey [12] as:
“For each individual, compute the counterfactual wage rate (with
no transfer) that would make the individual as happy as in his
current situation, and give priority (leximin) who are the worst-
off in these terms.”
Formally, it is equivalent to ranking the individuals in ascending order
according to wˆ that satisfies:
ui(C,L) = ui(B(wˆ, 0)) (24)
Figure 8 illustrates the wage egalitarian equivalence for John and Mary
again. The minimum wage required to allow the individuals to maintain
their utility in a no-tax context is larger for Mary than for John. John is the
worst-off in this case.
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INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
In programmatic terms, we estimate for each of the 9 working time inter-
vals the pairs (C˜k, Lk) defining the utility derived from the choice made by
the individual, as defined in Formula 16. We then fix a reference value for the
wage rate (zero or 5 USD for the minimum wage approach) and then com-
pute the maximum lump-sum transfer that gives to the individual his actual
level of well-being. The worst-off are the 10% individuals with the lowest
lump-sum taxes. Regarding the wage egalitarian equivalence, we compute
for each of the 9 working time intervals the ratio C˜k
k
. The smallest value
is the smallest net wage required to reach the actual level of utility. The
worst-off are the 10% individuals with the lowest required wage rates.
4 Comparison with Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria
4.1 Methodological preliminaries
We present in this subsection the methodological choices to make Roemer’s
and Van de gaer’s criteria comparable with conditional equality and egal-
itarian equivalence (see Ramos and Van de gaer [18] for a recent survey
of the empirical literature on these measures). We start by discussing the
cardinalization of well-being, the identification of responsibility and non-
responsibility factors and finally discuss Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria.
4.1.1 Cardinalization of well-being
For the application of conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence, the
form of the utility function itself does not matter, we only need to know
the way people rank the bundles (C,L) according to their preferences in
order to make orderings. Instead, Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria use
a cardinal measure of well being to make interpersonal comparisons. Taking
the observed earnings is not an appropriate solution as conditional equality
and egalitarian equivalence account for another dimension of well-being. A
possible solution is to take a measure of well-being. This is consistent with
the hypothesis made above about individuals’ behaviour.
The question is thus to select an appropriate cardinal measure of well-
being. We thus follow two strategies, one inspired by the conditional equality
approach, the other by the egalitarian equivalence.
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We detailed in the precedent Section that, to implement the conditional
equality criterion, we need to choose a reference utility function for everybody
in order to remove heterogeneity in preferences. It means that the value of
u˜(B(wi, tˆi)) that is obtained for conditional equality is (1) comparable across
individuals because the same utility function is used for everybody, and is (2)
an approximation of the current individual’s well-being. The point is that we
also need a unique utility function to implement Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria. In consequence, this conditional equality measure can be used to
implement Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria and will be easily comparable
with the results given by the conditional equality criterion.
Regarding the egalitarian equivalence, we saw that it consists in estimat-
ing the amount of resources that should be given to an individual such that
he reaches his current level of well-being if all individuals had the same cir-
cumstances. In consequence, this amount of resources reflects the current
well-being of the individuals and respects individuals’ preferences. This is a
second money metric for individual’s well-being. For example, if we take the
zero equivalence criteria, we obtain the resources needed by an individual if
he were not working to be as well off as he is in his current situation. One
limit is that this money metric corresponds to a virtual situation that may
not occur ever. Still, this measure enables us to implement Roemer’s and
Van de gaer’s criteria and is directly comparable with the results given by
the egalitarian equivalence criterion.
4.1.2 Criteria compatibility
The second problem we face is the fact that Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria make a distinction between effort and circumstance, and Fleurbaey
and Maniquet between preferences and non-responsibility factors.
To make the comparison more reliable among the four criteria, it is nat-
ural to define the circumstance in the same way as the non-responsibility
factors because both terms reflect the factors that are beyond individual’s
responsibility. Thus, the circumstance is unique and corresponds to the wage
rate7.
In the framework of Fleurbaey and Maniquet, the concept most similar to
effort is the difference in preferences which leads to distinct utility functions
across individuals. In this setting, it is impossible however to find one single
continuous value for effort. A way out is to use the RIA to determine one
continuous index of responsibility: firstly, the population is partitioned into
7More complex specifications could be of main interest but are left to other studies
since here the purpose is to offer a consistent comparison among several criteria and not
a detailed implementation of one specific criterion.
16
types according to the wage rate. Then, we draw the outcome’s distribu-
tion function of each type, the outcome being the well-being as defined in
the Subsection on the cardinalization problem. Finally, we assume that the
individuals belonging to the same percentile of their outcome’s distribution
function have exerted the same effort. In this way, we obtain an index of in-
dividuals’ effort. This method is coherent with Roemer’s definition of effort
and allows us to compute Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria consistently
within their original framework.
4.2 Implementing Roemer’s criterion
There is equality of opportunity according to Roemer when people exerting
the same effort obtain the same outcome. Measuring the fairness of any
distribution consists in comparing individuals’ well-being at each level of
effort across types.
With such a criterion, the worst-off may be defined as the individuals
with the lowest well-being at each level of effort. Improving equality of
opportunity requires maximizing the mean outcome of the individuals who
have the lowest well-being at each level of effort.
To implement this criterion, we firstly divide the population into types
(based on wage quantiles, following Fleurbaey and Maniquet approach). We
then take our cardinalization of well-being and apply the RIA to obtain an
indirect measure of effort: people who sit at the same decile of the utility dis-
tribution function of their type have exerted the same effort. Lastly, we take
the individuals with the lowest well-being for each value of effort and obtain
who the worst-off are according to Roemer’s criterion. Figure 9 represents
the worst-off according to Roemer’s criterion.
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
4.3 Implementing Van de gaer’s criterion
Equality of opportunity defined by Van de gaer’s is characterized by an econ-
omy where the average well-being of each type is equal. With such a defi-
nition, the worst-off cannot be identified individually. Instead they can be
defined as the type with the lowest average well-being. Here we do not need
to implement RIA. To identify the worst-off, we use the cardinalization of
the well-being detailed above and then measure the average well-being con-
ditional on the type. The worst-off are the individuals who belong to the
type with the lowest average well-being. Figure 10 represents the worst-off
according to Van de gaer criterion.
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INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE
5 Data and Results
5.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on US data from the Cross National Equiv-
alent File (CNEF) for 2005 that provides information on incomes in 2004.
It includes detailed information on socio-demographic variables. To keep
things simple and avoid discussions on the problems related to considering
household’s interests, we focus on singles without children. In addition, we
restrict our sample to people who work at least twenty hours a week8. We
also limit our sample to individuals aged between 20 and 65 years old who are
not self-employed, retired or fully engaged in education. We finally exclude
individuals whose capital incomes have a value superior to 10% of the labour
income9. This gives us a sample of 914 individuals. Table 1 provides some
descriptive statistics on the sample, where we see a quite large variability of
the annual net wage across socio-demographic characteristics.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Even though we restrict our sample to individuals who work at least
twenty hours, we estimate our model by letting to the individuals the freedom
to choose among all possible alternatives of working hours (including less than
20 hours). The wage rate is assumed to be constant whatever the number of
working hours, this is in line with Decoster and Haan model [8]. Distribution
of working hours is given in Figure 11.
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE
To build the budget set, we use the 2004 OECD report for the US to
derive the net income for each possible working hours. Precisely, we first
calculate the gross wage rate by dividing the individual gross labour earnings
by the annual working hours. Then, we make discrete the labour time such
as to vary between 0 and 55. For each discrete alternative, we compute the
8As we have poor information on transfers given to people who do not work, we restrict
our analysis to individuals least affected by transfers.
9Capital income would affect the level of the budget set and probably the decision of
working or not. Therefore, not taking into account capital income should affect the slope
of the utility function for low level of working hours. This is why we excluded individuals
with a capital income superior to 10% of labour income.
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corresponding gross total earnings and we use the report on tax income to
simulate the corresponding net earnings. Leisure is mapped in the space
zero-to-one and net income is expressed in units of 10000 dollars per year.
We do not include capital income in the estimation. The gross amount of
capital income the individual receives is available but there is no disaggrega-
tion by type of capital income and no data on net capital income. As taxes
depend on the sources of this income, net capital income cannot be properly
computed.
5.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the utility function for 6 variants.
The benchmark case is estimated on the full sample, with heterogeneous pref-
erences captured by the full set of socio-demographic variables (age, gender
dummy, ethnic dummies and education dummies). We first find that the
marginal utility of consumption and leisure (β > 0) is positive as expected,
and decreasing (α < 1), as expected. We then note that the age and gen-
der variables are the sole significant regressors capturing the heterogeneity of
preferences for leisure. Being a woman and being out of an intermediate age
(so being young or old) means a preference for leisure. High education has
also a positive impact on the preference for leisure but is slightly insignif-
icant. Other variables are clearly insignificant. These results do not differ
from those reported in the Decoster and Haan study for Germany [8] (ex-
cepted that they found that a low education level has a significant positive
impact on preference for leisure).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
To the benchmark model, we add 5 variants to check the robustness
of the estimates. The first variant (column 2) reports the estimates for a
sample where individuals with hourly wages inferior to 5 USD are excluded.
The second variant (column 3) excludes the same individuals and the ones
earning more than 100 USD per hour. The variants reported in column
4, 5 and 6 rely on the benchmark full sample but exclude ethnic variables,
education variables and both, respectively. No significant changes occur in
the estimates. The same regressors are significant. Signs remain unchanged.
On basis of the significativity of the regressors, we keep the model presented
in column 6 as our preferred model. The following steps rely on the estimates
of this variant.
Before diving into the worst-off analysis, we check the performance of
the utility model by comparing the working hours maximizing the utility of
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the individuals with actual choice made by the individuals. We find that
57% of the maximizing number of hours are equal or adjacent to the actual
number of hours of the individuals. This relatively low percentage, to some
extent, means that some unobserved preferences had an impact on the choice
of the individuals. Our approach to include a part of the information on the
unobserved preferences is in this context strongly recommended.
5.3 Who are the worst-off?
As a preliminary, we measure how taking individual preferences into account
affects the estimates. As illustrated in Table 3, the percent of worst-off com-
monly identified by models considering and, respectively, not considering,
individual preferences oscillates between 82.4% and 95.6% for conditional
equality (depending on the reference value for βL) and from 91.3% to 100%
for egalitarian equivalence. For each of the four criteria, results will be re-
ported for both the cases with and without consideration of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Firstly, regarding conditional equality, we fix four different reference val-
ues for βL. We first use the average of βL (around 10), then increase the
preference for leisure by setting βL equal to 20, 70 and 100. Intuitively,
by increasing the value of βL, higher wage-rate individuals should be the
worst-off. This is concordant with our results, as reported in Table 4. As we
increase the reference value for βL the results change significantly. If we as-
sume strong preferences for leisure, the worst-off turn to be white individuals
with higher education. Instead, when we took a reference value of 10, the
worst-off tend to be people black individuals with a rather low educational
level. It is also worth noting that not taking into account the individual
preferences ("without" column) can lead to different conclusions, as in the
low education case.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Regarding the egalitarian equivalence criteria, results, reported in Table
5 change slightly depending on the reference value for the wage rate. When
the reference value is equal to zero, the worst-off tend to be people with high
distaste for working, so that they need low transfer to be as happy as they
would be if they did not work. Here, in comparison with the composition
of the sample, the worst-off profile is a white woman with a high education
level. Again, not considering the individual preferences change the results
for the eduction parameter (cf "without" column).
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Regarding the wage egalitarian equivalence criterion and the egalitarian
equivalence when the reference value for the wage rate is equal to 5 dollars
per hour, the results are quite similar in terms of gender and ethnicity. The
proportion of men increases slightly as well as the proportion of black people.
Again, considering the unobserved heterogeneity leads to different results
as reported by the differences between "with" and "without" columns. It is
however worth noting that no difference occurs in the case of zero egalitarian
equivalence10.
Regarding Roemer’s criterion, we proposed and tested different cardi-
nalization of welfare, based either on utility derived from the conditional
equality approach or on the amount of the compensation tax derived from
the egalitarian equivalence approach. Results are reported in column one
under the label Roemer of Table 6. We do not detail results per cardinal-
ization because the results are identical. The reason is related to the way
circumstances are defined. Since our aim is to make consistent comparisons
with the results of conditional equality and egalitarian equivalence, we follow
Fleurbaey and Maniquet and define the wage as the circumstance. Necessar-
ily, a higher wage extends the budget set and the potential combinations of
consumption-leisure available to the individuals. Hence, there is no surprise
that the worst-off are those with the lowest wage rates. Notwithstanding
these results, the cardinalizations remain relevant for cases where the cir-
cumstances would include other variables11. We get results for Van de gaer’s
criterion which are similar to those of Roemer’s. The worst-off are the indi-
viduals who belong to the type with the lowest wage-rate.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
5.4 Differences and Similarities among the criteria
The final question we raise here is the following: are the worst-off common
to all criteria? In other words, can we raise a unique conclusion about the
victims of unfairness regardless of the criteria of inequality of opportunity
and the cardinalization we use?
10Since the information derived from the  is only provided in regions around or above
20 hours per week, no additional information is provided for the unobserved heterogeneity
when the working hours are close to zero. The equality of "with" and "without" columns
is therefore no surprise.
11Though this is out of the scope of our analysis, we explored the sensibility of the
cardinalization to inclusions of other circumstances such as gender and ethnicity and found
identifications changes in the worst-off identifications.
21
To this end, we take one particular version of each criterion. We com-
pare the min egalitarian equivalence with the conditional equality with the
average βL, with Van de gaer’s and Roemer’s criteria with a cardinalized out-
come following the conditional equality approach based on the average βL.
Comparisons based on other variants of the criteria do not change drastically.
We report in Figure 12 the socio-demographic characteristics of each crite-
rion and in Figure 13 the percentage of individuals who belong to multiple
criteria simultaneously.
INSERT FIGURE 12 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 13 HERE
We first note that 82% of the worst-off are worst-off according to the 4
criteria. As a consequence, 18% of the individuals are worst-off through 1,
2 or 3 criteria only. We secondly note that 6% of the worst-off are worst-
off according to the min egalitarian equivalence criterion only. This is half
a surprise since the 3 other criterion are derived from a same conditional
equality approach (through cardinalization for Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria). A similar analysis with zero wage egalitarian equivalence increases
the share of criterion specific worst-off (not reported here). We also note that
Roemer and Van de gaer criteria identify identically the worst-off. Again,
this comes from the choice made by Fleurbaey and Maniquet to define wages
as circumstances. Since wages directly determine the budget set, a larger
wage necessarily makes individuals better-off12.
Notwithstanding its limitations, this exercise is instructive in order to
evidence the impact of the normative choice we make when enabling inter-
personal comparisons. The fact that about 18% of the individuals are not
the worst-off across all the criteria shows that the hypothesis that allows us
to make interpersonal comparisons has an impact on the identification of the
proper target of any redistribution policy aiming at reducing unfairness.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes an empirical application of distinct fairness criteria. Our
contribution is twofold: Firstly, we define a model that allows us to better
12Due to the linearisation of the budget sets, there could be a case of worst-off differences
across Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s criteria, as illustrated in Figure 5, but this is not
observed in our sample. In general, Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s worst-off should no longer
be the same if we choose other variables to define the circumstances (socio-demographic
ones for example).
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approximate individuals’ preferences such as to apply the criteria of condi-
tional equality and egalitarian equivalence. Secondly, we propose to compare
these criteria with the criterion proposed by Roemer and the one proposed
by Van de gaer. In this way, we propose different approaches for translating
the ordinal model into a cardinal model. Each method derives from the nor-
mative choices raised by the criteria of conditional equality and egalitarian
equivalence in order to make the comparisons as reliable as possible.
We apply our model to a sample of singles from the CNEF dataset and
identify who are the worst-off according to each criterion. We find that
our model makes possible refining groups’ preferences to better approximate
individuals’ preferences. Then, we find that 18% of the individuals are not
commonly identified as worst-off across the criteria.
We conclude that (1) our model for identifying individuals’ preferences
allows to follow an empirical approach closer to the spirit of the Fleurbaey
and Maniquet measure of equality of opportunity, and (2) the discrepancies
in the identification of the worst-off across criteria and their variants shows
how important is to make explicit the normative assumptions on which rely
each criterion.
In terms of research agenda, we believe that studying the comparability
of criteria is a promising future area of exploration. Two combined challenges
are to determine how the definition of circumstances affects the comparabil-
ity and to measure the impact of the cardinalization approaches, that we
proposed in this paper, to make comparable the Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s
criteria.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on heterogeneity variables
Characteristics Share working hours per week mean annual net wage ($)
Less than high school 8.4% 42.9 21,205
Education: high school 34.7% 40.5 26,187
Education: more than high school 56.9% 41.4 36,693
White 56.4% 41.5 34,760
Black 37.9% 40.8 27,133
Other 5.7% 41.0 32,506
Women 46.3% 39.3 30,202
Men 53.7% 42.9 33,073
Sample 100% 41.2 31,745
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Table 2: Parameters of the utility function
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preference for consumption
αc 0.036 0.021 0.044 0.039 0.046 0.050*
[0.030] [0.038] [0.038] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029]
βc 7.611*** 7.571*** 7.814*** 7.574*** 7.543*** 7.520***
[1.707] [1.695] [1.818] [1.703] [1.697] [1.704]
Preference for leisure
αl 0.466 0.190 0.260 0.458 0.459 0.455
[0.417] [0.477] [0.468] [0.419] [0.417] [0.420]
constant 17.754** 13.814* 14.839* 17.518** 17.613** 17.459**
[8.191] [7.152] [7.651] [8.132] [8.128] [8.123]
age -0.511** -0.393** -0.406** -0.496** -0.494** -0.479**
[0.211] [0.187] [0.192] [0.207] [0.206] [0.202]
age2 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
women 1.330*** 1.449*** 1.504*** 1.335*** 1.258** 1.267***
[0.510] [0.559] [0.573] [0.509] [0.493] [0.494]
Less than high school 0.274 0.096 0.051 0.326
[0.762] [0.675] [0.714] [0.755]
High school 0.754 0.650 0.674 0.758
[0.500] [0.451] [0.469] [0.496]
Black 0.318 0.129 0.120 0.339
[0.438] [0.373] [0.394] [0.434]
Other 0.229 -0.201 -0.391 0.115
[0.883] [0.770] [0.828] [0.871]
β¯l 9.213 7.355 8.193 9.142 9.169 9.151
Observations 914 853 848 914 914 914
Log likelihood -1793.1 -1657.3 -1646.0 -1793.4 -1794.5 -1794.9
Standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Specification (1) is the benchmark case. Workers earning less than 5 USD per hours
are excluded from specification (2). Workers earning less than 5 USD per hours or
more than 100 USD per hour are excluded from specification (3). Specifications (4),
(5) and (6) are based on the benchmark case but vary on the regressors of βl, the
preference for leisure . β¯l is the sample average of βl. Less than high school and
High school are dummy variables with More than high school as reference. Black
and Other are dummy variables with White as reference value.
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Table 3: Percent of worst-off commonly identified by models considering, and
respectively not considering, the unobserved heterogeneity
Conditional Equality
β¯L 95.6%
βL = 20 91.2%
βL = 70 82.4%
βL = 100 82.4%
Egalitarian Equivalence
Zero wage 100.0%
Min wage 91.2%
Wage 93.4%
Table 4: Conditional Equality: percent of worst-off per social category -
comparison of estimates considering, and not considering, the unobserved
heterogeneity
CE β¯L CE βL = 20 CE βL = 70 CE βL = 100
With Without With Without With Without With Without
Women 9.9% 9.2% 9.9% 9.2% 10.4% 9.7% 10.4% 9.7%
Men 10.0% 10.6% 10.0% 10.6% 9.6% 10.2% 9.6% 10.2%
Black 14.7% 15.3% 14.5% 15.3% 13.9% 15.3% 13.9% 15.3%
White 6.8% 6.4% 7.0% 6.4% 7.4% 6.8% 7.4% 6.8%
Other 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 5.8% 9.6% 5.8%
Less than high school 20.8% 20.8% 20.8% 19.5% 19.5% 23.4% 19.5% 23.4%
High school 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 15.5% 15.1% 14.5% 15.1% 14.5%
More than high school 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.2% 5.4% 5.2% 5.4% 5.2%
The "with" and "without" headers refer to the approaches where the unobserved heterogeneity is consid-
ered, respectively not considered. Information on unobserved heterogeneity is derived from the difference
of  referred to in Equation 10.
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Table 5: Egalitarian Equivalence: percent of worst-off per social category
- comparison of estimates considering, and not considering, the unobserved
heterogeneity
zero EE min EE wage EE
With Without With Without With Without
Women 11.6% 11.6% 9.0% 8.3% 9.2% 9.9%
Men 8.6% 8.6% 10.8% 11.4% 10.6% 10.0%
Black 13.3% 13.3% 14.5% 14.7% 14.7% 14.2%
White 7.8% 7.8% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 7.2%
Other 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6%
Less than high school 19.5% 19.5% 20.8% 18.2% 19.5% 19.5%
High school 14.2% 14.2% 13.9% 15.1% 14.5% 13.6%
More than high school 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 5.6% 5.8% 6.4%
The "with" and "without" headers refer to the approaches where the unobserved
heterogeneity is considered, respectively not considered. Information on unobserved
heterogeneity is derived from the difference of  referred to in Equation 10.
Table 6: Ex-post Roemer and ex-ante Van de gaer criteria: characteristics of
the worst-off
Roemer Van de gaer
Women 9.5% 9.5%
Men 10.6% 10.6%
Black 14.7% 14.7%
White 7.0% 7.0%
Other 9.6% 9.6%
Less than high school 20.8% 20.8%
High school 14.5% 14.5%
More than high school 5.8% 5.8%
Percent of worst-off per category. Results constant
through the different cardinalizations.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous preferences
Figure 2: Inferring unobserved preferences
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Figure 3: A simplified (linear) budget set
Figure 4: Conditional Equality (a)
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Figure 5: Conditional Equality (b)
Figure 6: Zero-wage egalitarian equivalence
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Figure 7: Minimum-wage egalitarian equivalence
Figure 8: Wage egalitarian equivalence
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Figure 9: Roemer ex-post approach
Figure 10: Van de gaer ex-ante approach
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Figure 11: Working hours
Figure 12: Characteristics of the worst-off across criteria
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Figure 13: The worst-off according to each criterion
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